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DATA TYPES, DATA DOUBTS & DATA TRUSTS
JOÃO MARINOTTI*
Data1 is not monolithic. Nonetheless, the word is frequently used indiscriminately—in
reference to a number of distinct concepts. It may refer to information writ large, or
specifically to personally identifiable information, discrete digital files, trade secrets, and
even to sets of AI-generated content. Yet each of these types of “data” requires different
governance regimes in commerce, in life, and in law. Despite this diversity, the singular
concept of data trusts is promulgated as a solution to our collective data governance
problems. Data trusts—meant to cover all of these types of data—are said to promote
personal privacy, increase corporate transparency, facilitate the sharing of data, and
even pave the way for the next generation of artificial intelligence. These anticipated
benefits, however, require the body and flexibility of equitable trust law and its inherent
fiduciary relationships for their fruition. Unfortunately, American trust law does not
allow for the existence of such general data trusts. If anything, the judicial, academic,
and legislative confusion regarding data rights—or data’s status as property—
demonstrates that discussions of data trusts may be ignoring a key element. Without first
determining whether (or what kind of) data can be recognized as a trust res (i.e., as trust
property) under existing law, it may be premature to accept data trusts as the private law
solution to data governance. If, on the other hand, the implementation of data trusts
requires legislative intervention, its purported benefits must be analyzed in contrast to
the myriad other new and evolving data governance frameworks that would similarly
require legislation. By analyzing existing trust law and the difficulties of defining data
rights, this essay highlights the urgent need to pursue doctrinally, legislatively, and
technologically viable data governance strategies.
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INTRODUCTION

From the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic,2 to the George Floyd protests,3
to the Capitol riot of January 6, 2021,4 the early 2020s have been
unprecedented. In one specific way, however, it has been business as usual.
Meta, Alphabet, TikTok, and T-Mobile, among many other global tech
giants, were sued, investigated, and/or fined in jurisdictions across the world
due to their data practices.5 Such lawsuits are not unexpected. In the era of
surveillance capitalism,6 it is no wonder that these companies collect, use,
2 See Two Years of the Pandemic in New York, Step by Awful Step, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15,
2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/nyregion/nyc-covid-timeline.html
[https://perma.cc/AK7A-9LY7].
3 See Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/DWW5PJKZ].
4 See Kat Lonsdorf, Courtney Dorning, Amy Isackson, Mary Louise Kelly & Ailsa Chang, A
Timeline of How the Jan. 6 Attack Unfolded – Including Who Said What and When, NPR (June 9,
2022),
https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-timeline-of-how-the-jan-6-attackunfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when [https://perma.cc/8VPZ-2T5Q].
5 See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, Mark Zuckerberg Will Be Added to a Facebook Privacy Lawsuit,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/20/technology/mark-zuckerbergfacebook-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/AE5W-J9ZM] (describing a lawsuit alleging that
“Facebook misled consumers about privacy on the platform by allowing Cambridge Analytica, a
political consulting firm, to obtain sensitive data from more than 87 million users, including more
than half the district’s residents”); Jessica Davis, Google Sued, Lawsuit Claims COVID-19 Contact
Tracing
Tool
Exposes
Data,
HEALTH
IT
SEC.
(Apr.
30,
2021),
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/google-sued-lawsuit-claims-covid-19-contact-tracing-toolexposes-data [https://perma.cc/5NR5-HHQY] (describing a lawsuit alleging that Google exposed
contact tracing app “participants’ private personal and medical information associated with contact
tracing” to “dozens or even hundreds of third parties”); Bobby Allyn, TikTok to Pay $92 Million to
Settle Class-Action Suit Over ‘Theft’ of Personal Data, NPR (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/25/971460327/tiktok-to-pay-92-million-to-settle-class-action-suitover-theft-of-personal-data [https://perma.cc/2W4K-3UWR] (describing the settlement of a
lawsuit alleging that TikTok, “the popular video-sharing app[,] harvested personal data from users,
including information using facial recognition technology, without consent and shared the data with
third-parties, some of which were based in China”); Jake Holland, T-Mobile Hit with Class Action
Suits
After
Consumer
Data
Breach,
BLOOMBERG L.
(Aug.
20,
2021),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/privacy-and-data-security/X66IAT24000000
[https://perma.cc/2LSA-638M] (describing a lawsuit alleging that T-Mobile was negligent and
“violated the CCPA by failing to prevent consumers’ nonencrypted personally identifiable
information ‘from unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure’”).
6 See generally Donell Holloway, Explainer: What Is Surveillance Capitalism and How Does
It
Shape
Our
Economy?,
THE
CONVERSATION
(June
24,
2019)
https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-surveillance-capitalism-and-how-does-it-shape-
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and abuse the nearly endless amount of data we willingly hand over for what
have become indispensable and/or free services. Without being held
sufficiently financially accountable for data malfeasance,7 these companies
have few reasons to protect or prioritize our privacy and data security over
their singular—and legally legitimate—duty to maximize shareholder
value.8 From this point of view, underinvesting in cybersecurity and failing
to meet even the most basic of inform-and-consent privacy policies may be
a successful business practice in today’s regulatory environment.9
At the end of 2020, a federal judge offered a prime example of this lack
of accountability in a case against Facebook.10 Without disclosure or consent,
Facebook used customers’ IP addresses to sell localized advertisements. In
dismissing the class action complaint, Judge James Donato explained that
“[t]here is no legally protected privacy interest in IP addresses,” so plaintiffs
“cannot be injured from the collection of IP addresses, and so lack Article
III standing for the privacy claims under California common law, the
California constitution, and [the California Invasion of Privacy Act] that are
premised on that ostensible injury.” 11 The judge further clarified that
plaintiffs “also lack Article III standing for the unjust enrichment claim
because they have failed to make any allegation that ‘they retain a stake in
the profits garnered from’ the collection of their IP addresses.”12 Legally and
financially, then, was Facebook right to collect and profit from this consumer

our-economy-119158 [https://perma.cc/S5P9-BLAV] (explaining surveillance capitalism as “a
market driven process where the commodity for sale is your personal data, and the capture and
production of this data relies on mass surveillance of the internet”).
7 See, e.g., Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 1004 (2018)
(“[O]ur legal system has not yet created adequate incentives for individual companies to take the
necessary—and sometimes costly—steps to reduce the likelihood of cybersecurity attacks.”);
Jeffrey L. Vagle, Cybersecurity and Moral Hazard, 23 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 71, 100 (2020) (“The
current state of cybersecurity regulation is often described as a ‘patchwork’ of laws at federal and
state levels that lack the sort of coordination and coherence necessary to effectively promote the
security of our connected technologies.”).
8 See Vagle, supra note 7, at 103 (“[T]echnology companies often choose to shave their
development costs by reducing or eliminating resources necessary to support secure software
development.”); see also Felicia R. Resor, Benefit Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91,
95 (2012) (“The shareholder wealth maximization norm, derived from state corporate law and
national corporate norms, stands for the proposition that directors have a duty to maximize
shareholder wealth. . . . [D]irectors can be held liable for not doing so.”); Robert J. Rhee, A Legal
Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 2010 (2018) (“Courts have imposed the
obligation of shareholder primacy on the entire spectrum of managerial decisions.”).
9 Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, How Much Should We Spend to Protect Privacy: Data
Breaches and the Need for Information We Do Not Have, J.L. ECON. & POL’Y, Winter 2018, at
119, 121–22 (“Organizations have insufficient incentives to invest in strong data security . . . .
[L]ost or ‘stolen’ customer or employee data often does not deprive an organization of its continued
availability or use . . . . Further, the (negative) consequences of poor security and misused data fall
mainly if not entirely upon individual victims.”).
10 Heeger v. Facebook, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1191.
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data even without the proper informed consent? Its shareholders certainly
must think so.13
Even when companies are unquestionably at legal fault, the victims of
data malfeasance are frequently unable to receive adequate compensation, if
anything at all. The Equifax data breach of 2017 comes to mind as a prime,
and infamous, example. The names, birthdates, and social security numbers
of over 147 million Americans were exposed due to the company’s
mismanagement.14 Yet, if every victim claimed a portion of the allotted
settlement, each individual would receive roughly only twenty-one cents!15
Such settlements neither affect the business practices of these global giants,16
nor do they provide adequate remedies for the victims harmed. If these
consequences neither deter future cyber-negligence nor compensate victims
for harms experienced, what, then, are they for? Unfortunately, some argue
they are “mostly exercises in public relations,” remediating the reputation of
both regulators and companies alike.17
Given the evidence that existing systems of data governance
insufficiently incentivize privacy, cybersecurity, and respect for individual
data autonomy, it is not surprising that various alternate means of data
governance are being actively researched.18 In this Essay, I seek to examine
one such proposal that is gaining steam in academic and policy circles alike:

13 The underinvestment in cybersecurity and privacy need not always be attributed to malice
or negligence. “[I]nsights from behavioral economics and psychology show that human judgment
is often biased in predictably problematic ways,” which causes companies to “treat cybersecurity
as a finite problem that can be solved, rather than as the ongoing process that it is.” Alex Blau, The
Behavioral Economics of Why Executives Underinvest in Cybersecurity, HARV. BUS. REV. (June
7, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/the-behavioral-economics-of-why-executives-underinvest-incybersecurity [https://perma.cc/YQ96-DAN8].
14 Alvaro Puig, Equifax Data Breach Settlement: What You Should Know, FTC: CONSUMER
ADVICE (July 22, 2019), https://consumer.ftc.gov/consumer-alerts/2019/07/equifax-data-breachsettlement-what-you-should-know [https://perma.cc/CBG2-CMPN].
15 Shahar Ziv, Here’s Why You Could Get as Little as $0.21 from Equifax’s Data Breach
Settlement, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/shaharziv/2019/08/01/youmight-only-get-21-cents-from-the-equifax-data-breach-settlement-instead-of-125
[https://perma.cc/75HA-KPPE].
16 See Jonathan Trebble-Greening, Raising the Stakes: Creating an International Sanction to
Generate Corporate Compliance with Data Privacy Laws, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 763, 778
(2019) (“The fines . . . on companies . . . may not effectively alter corporate actions . . . [because]
companies like Google and Facebook earn exceedingly high revenues that current fines . . . do not
dent corporate coffers enough to create the deterrent effect.”).
17 Jason Aten, Equifax Promised It Would Give You $125. Then It Made It Clear That Was
Never Going to Happen. Here’s What You Should Do Now, INC. MAG. (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://www.inc.com/jason-aten/equifax-promised-it-would-give-you-125-then-it-made-it-clearthat-was-never-going-to-happen-heres-what-you-should-do-now.html
[https://perma.cc/32VH2T6D].
18 E.g., Marina Micheli, Marisa Ponti, Max Craglia & Anna Berti Suman, Emerging Models
of Data Governance in the Age of Datafication, BIG DATA & S OC’Y, July–Dec. 2020, at 1, 6
(examining four such models of data governance: data sharing pools (DSPs); data cooperatives
(DCs); Public Data Trusts (PDTs); and Personal Data Sovereignty (PDS)).
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the data trust.19 While acknowledging the importance of such research, I aim
to highlight potential doctrinal hurdles that may impede the successful
adoption and implementation of data trusts in the United States. In doing so,
I do not aim to shut down the conversation; rather, I seek to raise a set of
fundamental questions that must be dealt with for the successful adoption
and implementation of the model as a useful private law solution to our data
governance concerns.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the relationship
between trust law and fiduciary duties. In so doing, it highlights why the
concept of data trusts requires doctrinally valid equitable trusts to
sufficiently protect personal privacy and individual autonomy in an everevolving technological landscape. Part II dissects trust doctrine to distill the
rationales behind the requirement of an ascertainable and definable trust
property. By juxtaposing these rationales with existing attempts to define and
protect data, the Essay highlights the difficulties any court would encounter
in its attempt to recognize data as trust property under existing law. Finally,
Part III builds on this analysis to question whether data trusts are truly able
to fulfill what many of their advocates desire: immediate private
implementation. It argues that legislative intervention is nonetheless required
for the implementation of data trusts. The Essay concludes that data trusts
should only be legislatively pursued, however, if they offer advantages over
the myriad other new and evolving data governance frameworks that would
also require legislative action.
I
TRUST LAW & FIDUCIARY DUTIES

To adequately discuss the nuances and potential problems of data trusts,
it is first necessary to highlight another governance strategy: the strategy of
information fiduciaries.20
A.

Information Fiduciaries

To hold global tech giants more accountable, Professors Jack Balkin
and Jonathan Zittrain proposed a revolutionary solution based on an
ingenious and, in retrospect, obvious, observation. While their ideas would
require drastic—and potentially unlikely—legislative intervention in the
face of federal gridlock, the theory pushed for the introduction of fiduciary
19

See infra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. See generally infra Part II.
See generally Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech
Companies
Trustworthy,
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
3,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346
[https://perma.cc/RL3R-PERF]; Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First
Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016); Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy,
134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11 (2020).
20
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duties in the context of “huge online businesses, like Facebook, Google, and
Uber, that collect, analyze, and use our personal information.” 21
Balkin and Zittrain noted that in many ways, global tech giants resemble
doctors, lawyers, and accountants. Much like the Googles of the world, these
professionals “know so much about us.”22 Thankfully, though, “because we
have to depend on [such professionals], the law requires them to act in good
faith—on pain of loss of their license to practice, and a lawsuit by their
clients.”23 They “have to keep our secrets and they can’t use the information
they collect about us against our interests.”24 This legal relationship between
clients and their doctors, lawyers, and accountants is a fiduciary one. These
professionals have a fiduciary duty to their clients; they have a “duty to act
with due regard for the interests of another” (i.e., their clients).25 This
fiduciary duty legally prevents them from abusing the sheer quantity of
sensitive information at their disposal. Acknowledging the similarities
between these professionals and the tech giants, Balkin and Zittrain asked in
2016 why these global giants are not treated as “information fiduciaries.”26
Under this designation, tech companies would have legal obligations to
prioritize consumer privacy and data protection over profit—they would be
required to act with due regard for the interests of their consumers.
In spite of its conceptual attractiveness and broad support from
organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 27 the idea of
information fiduciaries has yet to be implemented in state or federal law.
And given the current political climate and legislative gridlock, it is unlikely
that any federal information fiduciary law or any other comprehensive
federal data privacy framework will be adopted in time to prevent the further
abuse of our personal information.28
Recently, alternative means of creating fiduciary relationships have
been explored. One of these may even bypass the legislative process by

21

Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 20.
Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Pagliara v. Johnston Barton Proctor & Rose, LLP, 708 F.3d 813, 818 (6th Cir. 2013).
26 Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 20.
27 Adam Schwartz & Cindy Cohn, “Information Fiduciaries” Must Protect Your Data
Privacy,
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Oct.
25,
2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/10/information-fiduciaries-must-protect-your-data-privacy
[https://perma.cc/EW57-AKMM].
28 For example, the Data Care Act sponsored by Senator Schatz would have established
fiduciary duties for online providers but died in the Senate in 2019. See Schatz Leads Group of 15
Senators in Introducing New Bill to Help Protect People’s Personal Data Online, U.S. SENATOR
FOR HAWAI’I BRIAN SCHATZ (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.schatz.senate.gov/pressreleases/schatz-leads-group-of-15-senators-in-introducing-new-bill-to-help-protect-peoplespersonal-data-online [https://perma.cc/X6PS-X64B].
22
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tapping into an existing area of private law: the law of trusts.29 In the United
States, a trust is a legal relationship in which one party, the trustee, holds and
manages assets for the benefit of another party, the beneficiary. Notably, a
trust relationship can be created privately by merely transferring assets to the
designated trustee.30 In a data trust, then, data would be “placed under the
control of a board of trustees with a fiduciary responsibility to look after the
interests of the beneficiaries.”31 This responsibility would be similar to, if not
the same as, the fiduciary duties promoted by Balkin and Zittrain, but without
the need for legislative action.
The idea of private data trusts32 is gaining traction in academic centers,
nonprofits, and think tanks around the world, like the Centre for International
Governance Innovation and the Ostrom Workshop, among many others.33
29 See, e.g., Lisa M. Austin & David Lie, Safe Sharing Sites, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 581, 618
(2019) (“Instead of waiting for the slow process of law reform to create such a regulatory
framework, the trust model offers a way of managing these emerging issues through a private law
mechanism.”).
30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 20 (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“Except as required by a
statute of frauds, a writing is not necessary to create an enforceable inter vivos trust, whether by
declaration, by transfer to another as trustee, or by contract.”).
31 Anouk Ruhaak, Data Trusts: Why, What and How, MEDIUM (Nov. 11, 2019),
https://medium.com/@anoukruhaak/data-trusts-why-what-and-how-a8b53b53d34
[https://perma.cc/7ESV-9ZBZ]. See also Ira S. Rubinstein & Bilyana Petkova, Governing Privacy
in the Datafied City, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 755, 809–10 (2020) (“For example, a group of Fitbit
and Apple Watch users might agree to pool their medical data in a data trust with explicit terms for
how the trustee may share the data for medical research purposes—subject to various limitations
set out in advance, and to the trustee's independent judgment of which uses uphold the interests of
the users.”). For a more thorough discussion of trust law, see generally infra Section I.B.
32 In this article, I discuss data trusts in their nominal form, meaning common law trusts over
data. Commentators in this field have broadened the meaning of the term to include merely
conceptually-similar data-management regimes, whether private or public, though such usages will
not yield trust-derived fiduciary duties under existing law. See, e.g., Richard S. Whitt, Hacking the
SEAMs: Elevating Digital Autonomy and Agency for Humans, 19 COLO. TECH. L.J. 135, 184 (2021)
(“A data trust is based on collective agency over the personal data and information of a specified
collective of individuals. Here the entity manages a pool of data on behalf of a community of
individuals.”); Kimberly E. Diamond, The Yoga Analogy: Scaling-Up the US’s Renewable Energy
Sector Mindfully with New Technologies, Evolving Standards, Public Buy-In, Data Sharing, and
Innovation Clusters, 32 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 381, 474–75 (2021) (“A ‘data trust’ is a construct
that allows multiple organizations within the public-private partnership to access shared data
anytime . . . . A data trust not only functions as a relationship builder and a catalyst for action, but
it also presents a legal framework that facilitates data sharing among member partners.”).
33 Bianca Wylie & Sean Martin McDonald, What Is a Data Trust?, CTR. FOR INT’L
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-data-trust
[https://perma.cc/BKF7-FZQC]; Digit. Civ. Soc’y Lab, A Framework for Data Trusts, STANFORD
CTR.
ON
PHILANTHROPY
&
CIV.
SOC’Y
(Mar.
28,
2019),
https://pacscenter.stanford.edu/research/digital-civil-society-lab/a-framework-for-data-trusts
[https://perma.cc/NFZ3-4EM5]; MOZILLA INSIGHTS, JONATHAN VAN GEUNS & ANA
BRANDUSESCU, SHIFTING POWER THROUGH DATA GOVERNANCE 13–14 (2020),
https://assets.mofoprod.net/network/documents/ShiftingPower.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4V5WA4XT]; Ostrom Workshop, Addressing Data Management & Information Governance, IND.
UNIV.,
https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/research/data-management/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6YD5-VGB4].
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According to the proponents of data trusts, this method of governance
is beneficial for a number of reasons above and beyond its built-in fiduciary
duties. The following three considerations highlight the range of such
proposed benefits. First, data trusts are said to promote “the beneficial use of
data” by “pooling data from various sources together” and “unlock[ing] the
ability for a data trustee to negotiate on behalf of the collective, rather than
an individual,” functioning much like a labor union but in the context of
data.34 Second, data trusts purportedly “could make it much easier for firms
to safely share data,” promoting the creation of next-generation AI
applications by addressing “the scarcity of varied, high-quality raw data.”35
And third, by using a data trust, a company may potentially be seen as more
trustworthy by establishing a structure that gives users “granular visibility
and control” into how their data is accessed, used, and managed.36 Although
the validity of these claims is outside the scope of this short Essay, it is clear
that data trusts are currently being explored as one of the most powerful and
viable private law solutions to the current struggles in data protection and
privacy. One technical but significant problem, however, is that the private
law of trusts in various American jurisdictions may not currently allow the
creation of a data trust at all.
B.

The Data “Trust”

Before diving into American trust law, what it requires, and how it may
(or may not) apply to data, it is useful to demonstrate what American trust
law is not. For this, we can compare it with German law, in which a trust
arrangement is merely a contractual obligation.37 In such an arrangement, the
roles of data generator, data manager, and data beneficiary38 may be
contractually defined, allocated, and enforced. One such arrangement was
entered into by Microsoft Germany, whereby an independent corporation
called T-Systems served as the contractual data trustee and “significantly

34

Ruhaak, supra note 31 (emphasis omitted).
George Zarkadakis, “Data Trusts” Could Be the Key to Better AI, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.
10,
2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/11/data-trusts-could-be-the-key-to-better-ai
[https://perma.cc/PL66-RRYW]. (“[A] data trust can guarantee transparency . . . as well as auditing
of who is using the data at any time and for what purpose . . . thus removing the considerable legal
and technological friction that currently exists in data sharing.”).
36 What Is a Data Trust? Everything You Need to Know, SIGHTLINE INNOVATION,
https://docs.sightlineinnovation.com/dtaas/overview.html#what-is-a-data-trust
[https://perma.cc/H6UL-VZBJ] (explaining data trusts decouple “the problem of cataloging,
managing, and sharing data assets from the problem of generating, viewing, and interacting with
them”).
37 See Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access to the Global Cloud, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1698
(2018).
38 For example, a corporation compiling raw but machine-readable data would be the data
generator; the data trustee would be the data manager; and the end users who provide the
corporation with their data would be the data beneficiaries.
35

154

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 97:146

restrict[ed] the access of Microsoft Germany to the information in its cloud”
through legal and technological means.39
In the United States, however, similar contractual relationships would
not yield the same results.40 For example, it is under an insurance contract
that we grant confidential healthcare information to insurance providers.
Insurers are under a contractual duty to keep this information secure. The
Supreme Court of Mississippi, however, found that such insurance contracts
do not create fiduciary duties and blamed the plaintiff, whose information
was improperly disclosed, for placing “any special degree of trust or
confidence” in the insurance company.41 Furthermore, it is well accepted in
the United States that the “mere presence of the term ‘trust’” does not turn a
contract into a trust and does not “transform the relationship between the
parties . . . to that of a trustee and beneficiary.”42 A contract, then, cannot by

39 Schwartz, supra note 37, at 1698 (describing how Microsoft’s German data trustee, TSystems, was independent from Microsoft and encrypted the data hosted on its cloud such that
Microsoft could not access that data). Note, however, that in 2019, Microsoft stopped accepting
new customers into this data arrangement. Due to an “evolution in customers’ needs” and the
structure’s “limits” in addressing such shifting needs, new customers can access services that align
with Microsoft’s “global cloud offerings.” Esat Dedezade, Microsoft to Deliver Cloud Services
from New Datacentres in Germany in 2019 to Meet Evolving Customer Needs, MICROSOFT (Aug.
31, 2018), https://news.microsoft.com/Micros/2018/08/31/Microsoft-to-deliver-cloud-servicesfrom-new-datacentres-in-germany-in-2019-to-meet-evolving-customer-needs
[https://perma.cc/WPB2-LYB4].
40 See, e.g., City Sols. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1049 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (“It is a well-settled principle that parties to a contract do not by necessary implication
become fiduciaries.”). In fact, the court continues on to say that even in the context of requisite
trust and confidence, contracts do not per se establish fiduciary duties. For example, “it makes great
sense not to impose fiduciary duties concomitantly with confidentiality agreements. The existence
of a detailed confidentiality agreement suggests arm’s-length dealings between co-equals.” Id.
Nonetheless, some courts do hold that “[i]f a contract establishes a relationship of trust and
confidence between the parties, . . . then a fiduciary duty arises from the contract which is
independent of the contractual obligation.” Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Franey Muha Alliant
Ins. Servs., 388 F. Supp. 2d 292, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (emphasis added). This framing is misleading
because it conflates two independent sources of law. While “fiduciary duties may arise out of a
contractual relationship,” it is the relationship established by the contract rather than the contract
itself that generates fiduciary duties. Id.
41 Robley v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 935 So. 2d 990, 995 (Miss. 2006) (“Although one does
not typically enter into a contract with another person unless he or she has a degree of trust or
confidence in that person, without more, such a transaction amounts to merely a business
relationship and not a fiduciary relationship.”). But cf. Lee Craig, Why a First Party Insurer Is Not
a Fiduciary, BUTLER WEIHMULLER KATZ CRAIG LLP (Nov. 16, 1999),
https://www.butler.legal/why-a-first-party-insurer-is-not-a-fiduciary
[https://perma.cc/TBD4KLUX] (noting that the Supreme Court of Nevada “opined” that the insurer-insured relationship is
“‘akin’” to a fiduciary one). In fact, Nevada’s position on the matter has strengthened over time,
evidenced by the removal of the words “akin to”: “The insurer-insured relationship is fiduciary in
nature.” Ins. Co. of the W. v. Gibson Tile Co., 134 P.3d 698, 703 (Nev. 2006).
42 In re Martin, 35 B.R. 982, 985 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (citing Davis v. Aetna Acceptance
Co., 293 U.S. 328, 334 (1934)); Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 334 (1934) (“The
resulting obligation is not turned into one arising from a trust because the parties to one of the
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mere language create a trust; nor is a trust merely a contractual relationship.43
Unlike contracts, Anglo-American trusts are creatures of equity, with
roots in the English courts of chancery (not English courts of law).44 While
the historical details may not be of relevance to this Essay, the following
short explanation may help clarify the discussion below. To this day, trusts
are relationships where interests in property are separated.45 Equitable
interests are granted to the beneficiary while the legal property interests are

documents have chosen to speak of it as a trust.”); In re Long, 44 B.R. 300, 305 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1983) (“Mere use of the words ‘trustee,’ ‘trust,’ or ‘express trust’ does not alone create a fiduciary
relationship . . . .”). Matter of Emporelli, 42 B.R. 814, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1984) (“[I]t is wellsettled that the mere presence of language in an agreement purporting to create a trust is not
determinative for purposes of nondischargeability.”). In re Long, 44 B.R. at 305 (“The court will
look not only at the language, but at the relationship and acts of the parties to determine whether a
trust exists.”); In re Schnitz, 52 B.R. 951, 955 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (“It must be emphasized, however,
that the mere presence of the term ‘trust’ in a contract ‘is generally insufficient’ . . . to create a trust
. . . .”). See also City of Hope Nat’l Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 181 P.3d 142, 152 (Cal. 2008)
(“[O]ne [contractual] party’s ability to exploit a disparity of bargaining power between the parties
does not necessarily create a fiduciary relationship.” (citations omitted)).
43 Stinnett v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 227 F.3d 247, 253 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that Texas
law “eschews a rule of contract-based fiduciary duty, holding instead that such a duty ‘arises from
the relationship and not from express or implied terms of the contract or deed’” (quoting Manges
v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. 1984))); AMY MORRIS HESS, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT &
GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, BOGERT’S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 17, Westlaw
(database updated June 2022) (“[A] trust which is completely created needs no consideration to
support it and make it enforceable . . . Contracts are still dependent on consideration for their
enforceability. This is a marked distinction between a trust and a contract.”); In re Naarden Tr., 990
P.2d 1085, 1089 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]he undertaking between the settlor and trustee is not
properly characterized as contractual . . . .”); Gibbons v. Anderson, 575 S.W.3d 144, 148 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2019) (“[A] trust agreement is not a contract.”); In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408, 410 (D.C.
2006) (“[A]n inter vivos trust is not a contract.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1079 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004))); In re Will of Allis, 94 N.W.2d
226, 229 (1959) (“[A] testamentary trust is not a contract.”). See also UNIF. TR. CODE § 105 cmt.
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (clarifying that even the “terms of a [written express] trust may not deny
a court authority to take such action as necessary in the interests of justice”).
44 See generally John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE
L.J. 625 (1995). Note also that although the substantive distinction between law and equity has
been all but erased in the minds of many judges, legislators, legal academics, and even law students,
equity still “hangs on by its fingernails,” refusing to be fully incorporated into law. Henry E. Smith,
Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. 1050, 1054–59 (2021); see also Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme
Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1053 (2015) (“[The Supreme] Court is acting
directly contrary to the conventional wisdom in remedies scholarship over the last four decades
[that law and equity are completely merged]. In these cases, the Court has preserved the line
between legal and equitable remedies.”).
45 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. L. INST. 2003) (noting that a trust “is a
fiduciary relationship with respect to property” where “the person who holds title to the property”
has “duties to deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least one of whom
is not the sole trustee”); id. § 3 (stating that “[t]he person who creates a trust is the settlor”; “[t]he
property held in trust is the trust property”; “[t]he person who holds property in trust is the trustee”;
and “[a] person for whose benefit property is held in trust is a beneficiary”).
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held by the trustee.46 Once a trust is established,47 it is the trustee who owns
legal title to the asset; the trustee has an in rem right, a right good against the
world.48 It is the trustee who imposes the “world’s duty not to trespass” or
otherwise interfere with the property.49 The beneficiary, on the other hand,
is granted the beneficial interest in the property. This is an equitable interest
granting “rights in personam against the holder of the legal title,” the
trustee.50
Now, with a shared understanding of trusts, yet another distinction is
equally relevant. The distinction is between rights subject to the law of
contracts and those that are governed by the law of property.51 It is
uncontroversial to say that data can be the subject of contract,52 but because
trusts and their fiduciary duties cannot be created by contract, this mere fact
is not helpful in validating the viability of data trusts.53 The important
question is whether data falls into the category of “property” for the purposes
of existing trust law in the United States. This crucial question, though, is
not always made explicit when the proponents of data trusts describe their
projects and policy goals, leaving such critical legal hurdles to mere
parentheticals and footnotes.54 If trusts and their fiduciary duties require trust
property, and if data cannot be such trust property, the very purposes of
46 The trustee’s interest may also be equitable, but diving into the many possible arrangements
of American trusts beyond what is explored below will not further the arguments of this Essay. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“Although trust beneficiaries
have equitable title, a trustee’s title to trust property may be either legal or equitable. Although it is
usually true . . . that the trustee has legal title . . . .”).
47 For our purposes, it suffices to say that trusts may be established by written or spoken words
and by the “interpretation of the words or conduct of the settlor in the light of all of the
circumstances surrounding the creation of the trust.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt.
a (AM. L. INST. 2003) (explaining possible sources of the “terms of the trust”).
48 See, e.g., Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations
Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 809 (2002) (discussing property rights in general and
distinguishing them from contract rights).
49 Id. at 809–10 (explaining how property law defines a property right by giving third parties
duties to the holder of the property right).
50 Comm’r v. Nevius, 76 F.2d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1935) (distinguishing property law’s regime
of legal and equitable interests held in trust from the tax code’s treatment of such assets, the latter
of which focuses solely on which interests happen to have “pecuniary value”).
51 For a fuller theoretical inquiry into this distinction, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 851–52 (2001) (“The difference
corresponds to the distinction between in rem rights and in personam rights . . . . [T]he distinction
. . . ‘is absolutely vital to grasping legally recognized practices like property’ . . . .” (quoting J.E.
PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 30 (1997))).
52 See, e.g., Ned T. Himmelrich, A New Breed of Copyright Issues, MD. BAR J., Nov.–Dec.
2003, at 18, 21 (noting that licenses are used to protect and manage data “through contract terms”).
53 See Joo, supra note 48, at 809–10 (explaining that contract law could not simulate property
rights because “transaction costs would be too great”).
54 See, e.g., MOZILLA INSIGHTS ET AL., supra note 33, at 14 (“[S]ignificant questions remain
about which laws are compatible where (for either ‘data’ or ‘rights to data’) . . . .”; Digit. Civ. Soc’y
Lab, supra note 33 (investigating the use of “data trusts within the context of civil society
organizations”).
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fiduciary duties in this context—to protect data privacy or autonomy, or to
promote any other goal of data governance—will be left unfulfilled.
II
DATA RIGHTS AND THE TRUST PROPERTY

For the purposes of trust law, “property” refers to “interests in things,
not necessarily the things themselves, but necessarily things that are legally
capable of being owned . . . and to which property interests can attach.”55
This definition has been applied quite liberally to include real and personal
property as well as tangible and intangible property.56 It may even include
intellectual property rights, shares of a company, or a beneficiary’s interest
in a life insurance policy.57 Thus, trust property—the trust res—is not limited
to tangible chattel or even to in rem property interests. As broad as this
definition is,58 however, data (or data rights) may nonetheless fail to meet it,
as the discussion below demonstrates.
If trust property must refer to “things that are legally capable of being
owned,”59 the key question for the creation of data trusts, then, is whether
data can be owned. From the way we discuss data colloquially, it may seem
that the answer is an unquestionable yes. I talk about “my data” or the
company’s data. But legally, the answer is far from clear. Scholars, judges,
and legislators are still struggling to determine whether or how data can be
owned, what such ownership would mean, and what body of law would
govern such ownership.60 While a few cases have already treated nonrival61
electronic documents and data as property for the narrow purposes of
conversion claims, there is still significant disagreement among courts.62
55

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 40 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2003).
See id. (describing the diverse set of rights that trust property may encompass); Jeremiah
Lau, James Penner & Benjamin Wong, The Basics of Private and Public Data Trusts, 2020 SING.
J. LEGAL STUD. 90, 103 (2020) (“[T]he law of trusts tends to be fairly liberal about the kind of
assets that can be held on trust.”).
57 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 40 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2003).
58 See Lau, Penner & Wong, supra note 56.
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 40 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2003).
60 For a non-exhaustive list of competing judicial and academic analyses, see João Marinotti,
Tangibility as Technology, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 671, 723 n.239 (2021).
61 See id. at 697 (defining nonrival goods in this context as those, such as “intellectual property,
information, or data,” that can be copied perfectly and taken or used by person B such that the
original owner A suffers no deprivation of use or access); see also Thomas C. Brown, John C.
Bergstrom & John B. Loomis, Defining, Valuing, and Providing Ecosystem Goods and Services,
47 NAT. RES. J. 329, 357 (2007) (“A rival good is one for which consumption by one person reduces
the amount of good or service available to others, as is the case with apples and haircuts.”).
62 See, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1278 (N.Y. 2007)
(“[E]lectronic documents and records stored on a computer can also be converted . . . .”); Integrated
Direct Mktg., LLC v. May, 495 S.W.3d 73, 76 (Ark. 2016) (“[E]lectronic data . . . can be converted
if the actions of the defendant are in denial of or inconsistent with the rights of the owner or person
entitled to possession.”). But see, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd., No. 1456
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Given this lack of legislative, precedential, and academic support, some
commentators go so far as to say that data is not ownable at all under any
body of existing American law.63 With this background in mind, proponents
of data trusts attempt to bypass this controversial topic by arguing that a
common law legal property interest is not necessary for the creation of a
trust. As explained below, they go on to argue that data rights as created by
privacy or consumer protection statutes are sufficient to be placed in trust as
a trust res without solving the thorny question of data propertyhood.64 The
following discussion demonstrates that such an approach runs with equal
force into various dead or perplexing ends, making the discussion of data
propertyhood a necessity yet again.
While European data trusts are outside the scope of this Essay,
commentators sometimes argue that the rights granted under Europe’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)—and, similarly, the California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)65 or the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA)66 in the United States67—may themselves be placed into
data trusts as trust property.68 Such arguments, however, fail to prove that

CV-748, 2016 WL 4033276, at *27 (W.D. Wis. July 26, 2016) (“[T]here is, at least so far, no
support from Wisconsin courts for such an expansion of this state’s common law [to recognize
conversion claims of electronic data] . . . .”); Wells v. Chattanooga Bakery, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 381,
392 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (“[A]n action for the conversion of intangible personal property is not
recognized in Tennessee.”).
63 See, e.g., Lothar Determann, No One Owns Data, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 42–43 (2018)
(“Existing property laws intentionally exclude data from subject matter definitions.”); Sylvia
Zhang, Who Owns the Data Generated by Your Smart Car?, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 305
(2018) (“Raw data cannot be ‘owned’ in the same legal sense that traditional intellectual property
can be owned . . . .”).
64 See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.
65 See generally MICHAEL BAHAR & MARY JANE W ILSON-BILIK, EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND,
CALIFORNIA’S NEW DATA PRIVACY LAW: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (2018),
https://us.evershedssutherland.com/portalresource/lookup/poid/Z1tOl9NPluKPtDNIqLMRV56Pab6TfzcRXncKbDtR
r9tObDdEpSpDm83!/fileUpload.name=/Cali%20new%20data%20privacy%20law.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TGB5-TC4P] (explaining the CCPA’s jurisdictional reach and the new rights
over personal data created by the Act). For updates to the CCPA, see Webb McArthur, California
Governor Approves Changes to CCPA and CPRA, AM. BAR ASS’N: BUS. L. TODAY (2021),
https://businesslawtoday.org/month-in-brief/october-in-brief-business-regulation-and-regulatedindustries-2021 [https://perma.cc/JWF7-9KP5].
66 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/1 (West 2008); see also Lauren Stewart, Big Data
Discrimination: Maintaining Protection of Individual Privacy Without Disincentivizing
Businesses’ Use of Biometric Data to Enhance Security, 60 B.C. L. REV. 349, 370 (2018)
(describing Illinois’s “comprehensive law addressing businesses’ collection and use of biometric
information”).
67 See Geoffrey Xiao, Bad Bots: Regulating the Scraping of Public Personal Information, 34
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 701, 715 (2021) (noting how both California’s CCPA and Illinois’s BIPA
grant residents of those states a set of rights similar to, though not exactly the same as, the GDPR
in Europe).
68 See, e.g., Sylvie Delacroix & Neil D. Lawrence, Bottom-up Data Trusts: Disturbing the
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the data rights under the GDPR are sufficiently akin to property rights for
the purposes of trust law, rather than being akin to the rights of bodily
autonomy or privacy,69 which are inalienable and cannot be placed in a
trust.70 Furthermore, as Professor Kieron O’Hara has noted, the GDPRcentric data trust model fails to solve an underlying power asymmetry that it
was originally meant to solve because it “assumes that the data subject is
unable to give informed consent to a data controller . . . but at the same time
is able to understand and initiate legal relations with the trustee.”71 In other
words, how would consumers have the legal sophistication and positional
power to understand and tailor their relationship with a data trustee beyond
their (in)ability to understand and negotiate existing big tech terms of
service? They likely wouldn’t.
Thus, if GDPR-like rights (e.g., rights granted under the CCPA or
BIPA) are not sufficient to establish a recognizable trust res, we must return
to the hotly debated legal status of data under American property law to then
determine if data can serve as a trust res. And, as noted above, the caselaw
on the subject has not brought us closer to a consensus, nor have analyses of
public policy or legal theory. On one side of the debate, Professors Paul
Schwartz and Lawrence Lessig have offered accounts of how data ownership
through property law could usher in an era of responsible governance
through a commodified data market in which data owners would be able to
control the use of their personal information.72 On the other side, Professors
‘One Size Fits All’ Approach to Data Governance, 9 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 236, 236 (2019) (“[T]he
data trustees would exercise the data rights conferred by the GDPR (or other top-down regulation)
on behalf of the Trust’s beneficiaries.”) (emphasis added). But see, e.g., Wendy Jing Wen Xu,
Recognizing Property Rights in Biometric Data Under the Right of Publicity, 98 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 143, 161 n.161 (2020) (noting that BIPA and other “biometric data legislative schemes
deal exclusively with privacy rights, not property rights”); Greg Lastowka, User-Generated
Content and Virtual Worlds, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 893, 896 (2008) (noting that if
individuals “have any right to object to the monetization of [their] data, it is via a right of privacy,
not property”).
69 Some commentators go so far as to say that “when people argue for ‘property over data,’
they are arguing for ‘some kind of right over data, not necessarily a property right, that is protected
by a property rule.’” Ignacio Cofone, Beyond Data Ownership, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. 501, 571
(2021) (going on to argue that data property is “inadequate at protecting privacy rights” because
“[d]ata property proposals leave out important dignitary considerations, ignore asymmetric
information and unequal bargaining power, and fail to address the harms produced by aggregated
and inferred personal data”).
70 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 40 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“[A] personal
injury cause of action is not transferable and cannot thereby be made the subject of a trust.” (quoting
Vittands v. Sudduth, 730 N.E.2d 325, 333 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000))).
71 Kieron O’Hara, Data Trusts, 6 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 484, 489, 491 (2020) (“[L]iteral
data trusts aren’t going to solve the Facebook problem, and neither will metaphorical data trusts
work as PR exercises for the tech giants.”).
72 See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056,
2125–26 (2004) (“A strong conception of personal data as a commodity is emerging . . . . This
Article’s goal has been to develop a model for the propertization of personal information that also

160

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 97:146

Pamela Samuelson, Mary Fan, and Dan Hunter have variously argued that a
market over property rights in data would not only hinder efforts at
protecting individual privacy and security, but would also create a cyber
anticommons, hindering innovation and economic activity writ large.73
The sheer number of competing viewpoints demonstrates that defining
the exact nature of property (or non-property) rights to data will require
significant attention before any consensus can be reached.
A.

Trust Law and the Res

Despite these disagreements over the exact legal nature of data, trust
law may be able to bypass such questions entirely. Note that ownership over
a trust res may refer to ownership over land, chattel, choses in action, life
insurance, good-will, trademark, trade secrets, intellectual property, stocks,
bonds, and even beneficial interests in other trusts.74 In summary, property
of many forms may be held in trust. 75 What is important is not the exact
nature of each type of property capable of being held in trust, but rather what
they all have in common. Determining the legal nature of data may not be
required if we can determine that data shares these common features and is,

exhibits sufficient sensitivity to attendant threats to personal privacy.”); id. at 2094 (“[T]he
understanding of property as a bundle of interests . . . helps frame a viable system of rights with
respect to personal data . . . [focusing on]: inalienabilities, defaults, a right of exit, damages, and
institutions.”); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63
(1999) (noting that those who use individuals’ data could be forced to internalize the cost of doing
so via property laws which would enable those individuals to engage in market negotiation).
73 See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1129
(2000) (“A property rights model for protecting personal data nevertheless presents many
problems.”); see also Mary D. Fan, Private Data, Public Safety: A Bounded Access Model of
Disclosure, 94 N.C. L. REV. 161, 205–06 (2015) (“Data ownership and control has the power to
illuminate or obscure dangers to public health and safety.”); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and
the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 518–19 (2003) (noting that
commercial businesses have “now . . . convince[ed] judges to carve out remarkable new property
rights online . . . [and] eroded cyberspace’s public commons, [which] . . . threaten[s] to create a
genuine digital anticommons.”). Anticommons property may emerge when “multiple people hold
rights of exclusion to a property such that no one has an effective right of use.” Hunter, supra, at
444. As a result, the property may be “locked into suboptimal and wasteful uses because the holders
of the exclusion rights block the best use of the resource”—a “tragedy of the anticommons.” Id. As
another example of the negative consequences of creating a market for property rights in data,
Professor Samuelson notes that “[c]reating a property right in personal data may . . . be
objectionable to those who consider information privacy to be a fundamental civil right.”
Samuelson, supra, at 1142.
74 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 40 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“Trust
property may be real or personal, tangible or intangible. It may consist of such diverse rights as
undivided interests, terms of years, contingent future interests, and choses in action . . . . ”).
75 But both the First and Second Restatements of the Law of Trusts note that “there are interests
which are not property, such as the interest in freedom from harmful bodily contact or other interests
in personality” which cannot “be made the subject of a trust.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS §
74 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 74 cmt. b (AM. L. INST.
1959) (same).
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therefore, sufficiently “property-like” for the purposes of trust law.76
For data to be an eligible trust res, all that is necessary is a “definite or
ascertainable” right to data whose immediate ownership can be easily
discerned.77 This requirement serves two purposes. First, it ensures that the
contents and boundaries of the trust res—over which the trustees normally
have a full unencumbered title such as fee simple absolute—are understood
by all relevant parties.78 As Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith
summarized:
This permits the trustee to deal with [trust] assets the way a full owner
would—by buying, selling, leasing, or mortgaging the assets as market
conditions dictate, in order to maximize the risk-appropriate return to the
trust. The beneficial interest, however, is often carved up among several
beneficiaries spread over multiple generations. . . . If contingent
remainders and executory interests were commonly encountered as in rem
rights, they would greatly complicate the process of processing
information about these rights, certainly for transactional and securedlending purposes.79

Second, requiring a definite and ascertainable trust res serves an
evidentiary purpose, ensuring that a trust can be unequivocally created
through the unambiguous transfer and delivery of the trust res. It allows “the
court to be confident that the settlor did indeed transfer the property to a
76 That is not to say that the nuances of trust law are exactly the same across various American
jurisdictions. As the Fifth Circuit explains in Casa Orlando Apartments, Ltd. v. Fed. Nat’l
Mortgage Ass’n, 624 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2010), “[w]hile the basic principles of fiduciary law
may be the same throughout the country, the nuances vary, and those nuances affect the outcome
of claims.” The Fifth Circuit then catalogs differences among the factors necessary for the creation
of a trust under the laws of several states; for example:

In Illinois, for example, a valid express trust requires: 1) intent of the parties to create a
trust as shown by a writing or by circumstances; 2) a definite subject matter of trust
property; 3) ascertainable beneficiaries; 4) a trustee; 5) specifications of a trust purpose
and how the trust is to be performed; and 6) delivery of the trust property to the trustee.
. . . Under Texas law, a ‘fiduciary relationship is an extraordinary one and will not be
lightly created.’ Thus, ordinarily ‘an express trust does not arise unless the owner of
property has shown an unequivocal intention to create a trust.’ If ‘the person to whom
the settlor’s wish is addressed has a clear discretion to act as he thinks fit,’ no trust is
created. . . . The District of Columbia has a simpler standard, requiring that ‘the settlor
need only manifest an intention to impose upon herself or upon a transferee of the
property equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person.’ The
law of the District of Columbia further requires the trustee to take title of the trust assets.
Id. at 194–95.
77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 40 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“There is no trust
property if the identity of the intended subject matter remains wholly in the control of the settlor or
if its description is so indefinite that it cannot be ascertained.”).
78 Fee simple absolute is the “broadest property interest allowed by law, [which] endures until
the current holder dies without heirs.” Fee Simple, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
79 THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 771–72
(3d ed. 2017).
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trustee for the benefit of the beneficiaries.”80 This certainty protects both the
supposed settlor and the supposed trustee(s). Courts “protect the purported
transferor . . . against false or mistaken claims that he or she had transferred
the property away in a trust.”81 And given the “extraordinary” nature of
fiduciary duties,82 courts protect the purported trustee from being unwillingly
subjected to the duties of prudence, loyalty, and impartiality, among others,
for the benefit of the settlor.83
In this requirement, there is a doctrinal focus on factual clarity rather
than on the legal nature of the assets held in trust. Knowledge and certainty
(e.g., about what constitutes the trust res) are significantly more crucial for
the purposes of trust law than a formalistic analysis of the legal nature of the
underlying trust corpus. This factual focus has allowed trusts to evolve from
tools largely meant to manage “land, personal property, and intellectual
property rights” to tools used to govern “stocks, bonds, and other readilymarketable intangible assets with income-earning potential.”84 As the
contents of the trust corpus have become more and more abstract, the need
for defined rights and clear delivery has only grown stronger. Clarity in the
ownership structure of trusts is now crucial not only in protecting settlors but
also in “promot[ing] the reliance of outsiders, such as lenders and other
creditors.”85
Given data’s prominence as a market-ready, income-earning asset, the
desire to create, manage, and profit from data trusts is not surprising. Data,
after all, has been called the “‘oil’ of the modern economy.” 86 A crucial
question, therefore, is whether data can fulfill the factual clarity required of
a trust res. Are data or data rights sufficiently defined? Can the delivery of
data be unambiguously ascertained? These questions have not been
sufficiently addressed for data trusts to be accepted as legitimate creations of
80 John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1121
(2004).
81 Id.
82 Stinnett v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 227 F.3d 247, 253 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that “[a]
fiduciary relationship is an extraordinary one and will not be lightly created” since “[f]iduciary
duties do not abound in every, or even most, garden variety, arms-length contractual relationships,
even those among trusting friends” (first citing Castillo v. First City Bancorporation of Tex., 43
F.3d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 1994); and then citing Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp.
Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594–95 (Tex. 1994))).
83 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS pt. 6, ch. 15, intro. note (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“The
core of trust fiduciary law is . . . the trustee’s duties of prudence . . . , loyalty . . . , and impartiality
. . . .”); id. § 35 cmt. a (“Given the nature of the fiduciary relationship, it is inappropriate to force a
person to act in that capacity.”).
84 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 79, at 770.
85 Langbein, supra note 80, at 1121.
86 See, e.g., Matthew S. DeLuca, The Hunt for Privacy Harms After Spokeo, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2439, 2451 (2018) (“This constant flow of information, and the insights and revenues it can
generate for businesses, has led to data being described as the ‘oil’ of the modern economy.
Recognizing this potential, businesses have for years identified their data stores as among their
most prized assets.”).
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private law. One reason for this is that data may have multiple independent,
overlapping, or even contradictory definitions, undermining trust law’s
requirement of a definite and ascertainable trust res.
B.

Defining Data (Rights)

In the confines of this Essay, I do not aim to provide an exhaustive list
of the ways in which the word “data” is currently used; a comprehensive
taxonomy of digital information assets could surely encompass an entire
book, if not more. Nonetheless, the purpose of this Section is to demonstrate
that cleanly and clearly defining data rights such that they are sufficiently
definite and ascertainable for the purposes of trust law—or choosing one of
many potential definitions—will be a difficult task. It will be especially
difficult to define through a common law process, as would necessarily be
the case without legislative intervention.
Generically, “data” can simply mean “factual information.” 87 This
definition encompasses everything ranging from Napoleon Bonaparte’s
height88 to the current temperature in your house. But as Professor Ignacio
Cofone has noted, “[n]either under existing law nor under data property
would I have a right, for example, to prevent other people from noticing I
bought a banana when I went to the supermarket.”89 At most, I would retain
a right to prevent the store owner from entering “the information into a
customer data bank to then sell to third parties.”90 Thus, as may have been
expected, mere information (i.e., facts) is not a sufficiently narrow definition
of data for ownership purposes.
More narrow definitions have been statutorily created in the context of
personally sensitive information. But even within relatively comparable
frameworks, definitions contain significant differences that would alter the
rights held under data ownership. Take the CCPA and GDPR’s definitions
of “personal information” and “personal data,” respectively, as listed in
Table 1.
TABLE 1
CCPA

87

Personal information is information that identifies, relates to, or could reasonably be linked with you or
your household.91

Data, supra note 1.
See Una McIlvenna, Was Napoleon Short? Origins of the ‘Napoleon Complex,’ HISTORY
(Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/napoleon-complex-short [https://perma.cc/Y5XH33E6] (“Napoleon’s height was just over ‘5 pieds 2 pouces’ (5’2”). Applying the French
measurements of the time, that equals around 1.69 meters, or just over 5’5”. So at 5’5” he was just
an inch or so below the period’s average adult male height.”).
89 Cofone, supra note 69, at 521.
90 Id. (engaging in a hypothetical thought experiment).
91 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1)(A)–(K) (West 2022) (emphasis added).
88
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Personal data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (“data
subject”).92

While these definitions may appear superficially similar, there is a
subtle but significant difference. Unlike the GDPR’s definition of “personal
data,” the CCPA’s “definition of personal information specifically includes
household information.” 93 Thus, the underlying data pool considered to be
personal information under the CCPA is, in some respects, a lot broader than
under the GDPR.94 That said, the CCPA, “apart from allowing individuals to
opt out of sales of their personal data, affords individuals little control” over,
for example, the initial collection of such data.95 The GDPR, on the other
hand, attempts to “enable individuals to refuse to give companies their data
in the first place.”96 And as Anupam Chander, Margot Kaminski, and
William McGeveran have noted, unlike the CCPA, the GDPR grants
individuals “robust rights throughout the life cycle of data processing,
including the right to rectification of incorrect information; the right to
prevent automated individual decision-making and to receive explanation of
any automated decision; and broader rights related to erasure of data and
withdrawal of consent.”97
Without legislative intervention, which version of “personal
information” would a data trust rely on? Would household information
qualify? Which set of individual rights would a data trustee manage on behalf
of the data generators? One could imagine that such necessary details could
be defined in the trust document itself. Such details, however, are not usually
left to the discretion of the private parties involved in the trust’s creation;
they are predefined by law, as the following analogy illustrates.
Instead of data, imagine a trust created to manage a plot of land. As is
expected, the land “can be bought and sold, invested and reinvested, leased
and mortgaged, in the sound discretion of the trustee as if the property were
an undivided fee simple.”98 The trustee’s power to manage in this way relies
92 Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 3 (emphasis added), https://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/2016-05-04
[https://perma.cc/F7RB-HDGN].
93 Carol A.F. Umhoefer, CCPA vs. GDPR: The Same, Only Different, DLA PIPER (Apr. 11,
2019) (emphasis added), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2019/04/ipt-newsq1-2019/ccpa-vs-gdpr [https://perma.cc/FW4R-TGDD].
94 See generally GDPR/CCPA High-Level Comparison Chart,
PERKINS COIE,
https://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/2/0/v4/204145/2108-CCPA-Comparison-Chartv.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/57BR-93A2].
95 Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law,
105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1757 (2021).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1757–58.
98 Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 849.
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on the fact that “the trust entails the transfer of full legal title over assets to
the trustee . . . [so] the trustee exercises most of the bundle of in rem rights
associated with these assets.”99 The trust does not and cannot define the
bundle of in rem rights associated with the underlying asset; that is a matter
of property law.100
As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have explained, trust law’s
reliance on legally defined rights (i.e., rights defined by law) over the
underlying asset is no accident. If the in rem rights associated with the trust
asset were able to be defined by the trust instrument itself, new types of in
rem property rights would be created by individuals as needed.101 A
consequence of this open-ended list of property rights would be that third
parties would “incur additional costs of gathering information in order to
avoid violating novel property rights or to decide whether to seek to acquire
these rights.”102
Third parties engaging with the trustee would have to become
intimately familiar with the terms of the trust (if they even know that a trust
exists) in order to determine whether the trustee is legally allowed to engage
in any potential third-party transaction involving the underlying trust asset.103
This would undermine one of the purposes of trust law;104 it would
compromise “the reliance of [third parties], such as lenders and other
creditors,” on the legal legitimacy of a trustee’s management decisions.105
Because trust law grants the trustee rights defined by law (not by
individuals), third parties need not consider the details of the trust when
engaging with the trustee. Rather, “when issues arise that implicate the in
rem rights associated with the trust assets, the fact that the assets are held in
99

Id. at 847 (emphasis added).
Specifically, the property law principle of numerus clausus (which is implicit in common
law systems) “prevents the customization of property interests. In the absence of this simple
common law rule, the normative commitments that comprise our rights and duties with respect to
the tangible objects in the world would rapidly grow so complex as to overwhelm our capacity to
understand them, let alone enforce them.” Meredith M. Render, Complexity in Property, 81 TENN.
L. REV. 79, 82 (2013); see also Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual
Property, 80 TENN. L. REV. 235, 238 (2013) (“Contracts are generally governed by default rules
that can be freely altered . . . . In contrast, a transfer of real or tangible property is forbidden unless
the transfer is . . . within one of ‘a limited number of standardized forms.’”).
101 Although “the relations among parties to a trust agreement [i.e., the settlor, trustee, and
beneficiary] are governed by legal rules that track the law of contract,” which can generally be
tailored by the contracting parties, the legal property interests held by the trustee are “limited to a
small number of standardized types.” Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 796, 845 (emphasis added).
102 Id. at 777 (“[F]ree customization of property forms would create an information-cost
externality; mandatory standardization is the legal system’s way of reducing these external costs to
an acceptable level.”).
103 See id.
104 Id. at 849 (“In effect, the trust is a brilliant device that allows for considerable customization
of beneficial interests . . . while at the same time consolidating the assets used to fund these
beneficial interests in a form that minimizes third-party information costs.”) (emphasis added).
105 Langbein, supra note 80, at 1121.
100
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trust is generally irrelevant to the resolution of these issues.”106 Ultimately,
the reliance on legally defined rights allows trust law to lower information
costs and increase efficiency.107
By applying this analogy and analysis to trusts over data, it becomes
apparent that the law of trusts cannot leave the definition and scope of data
rights to the discretion of individuals (e.g., settlors). The definitions must be
defined by law. Without legislative intervention, then, the definition and
scope of data for the purposes of data trusts, and the scope of rights granted
to trustees would be up to the courts. Unlike in the context of contract
interpretation, however, the definitions and rights acknowledged by courts
would not be limited to each individual trust. Such definitions and rights,
much like the in rem rights over land,108 would be applied to all data trusts.
A uniform set of definitions and rights over data established by courts
may seem useful until courts attempt to apply these same rights, rules, and
restrictions to data of various types. Given the variation in data governance
regimes, it seems evident that various different rules should apply to the
various different categories and definitions of data. For example, within the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), there are distinct rules for
Personally Identifiable Information (PII); Sensitive Personally Identifiable
Information (SPII); Proprietary Business Information (PBI); Unclassified
Controlled Technical Information (UCTI); Sensitive but Unclassified
(SBU); For Official Use Only (FOUO); Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES);
and other types of data.109 Health data governed by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),110 too, is not all treated
equally;111 the HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to “individually identifiable
health information, called protected health information,” while the HIPAA
Security Rule applies only to “individually identifiable health information a
covered entity creates, receives, maintains or transmits in electronic form,”
which it labels “‘electronic protected health information’ (e-PHI).”112
Given the diverse nature of the underlying data in question, it is no

106

Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 847.
Id. at 840, 849 (noting also how similar arrangements of in rem and in personam rights
decrease information costs and increase efficiency in the law of security interests).
108 See, e.g., JOHN A. BORRON, JR. & LEWIS M. SIMES, SIMES AND SMITH: THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS § 62 THE POSSESSORY ESTATES (3d ed. 2002) (defining “fee simple, the fee
tail, . . . the life estate, the term of years, the periodic tenancy, and the tenancy at will”).
109 Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Program Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/cui/controlled-unclassified-information-cuiprogram-frequently-asked-questions-faqs [https://perma.cc/A5F5-HUMJ].
110 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
111 See Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html
[https://perma.cc/U4D8-A5F4].
112 Id. (“The Security Rule does not apply to PHI transmitted orally or in writing.”).
107
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wonder that each of these data governance regimes defines data and data
rights differently. A single set of definitions and rights would likely fail to
achieve the normative goals of data rights, data privacy, and data protection
regimes.
C.

Beyond Information

So far, this Part has discussed the wide variety of personal or otherwise
sensitive information that has been subject to data governance regimes or to
proposed data property rights. Yet this is not where the discussion of data
ownership ends. Databases, individual digital files, and stored emails, among
other digital assets, have also raised questions of data ownership.
For an illustrative example regarding emails and files, let us turn to the
case of Louis Thyroff.113 Louis was an insurance agent for the Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) who was leased a work computer
in 1988. This allowed Louis to more easily access, use, edit, and add
customer information to Nationwide’s centralized computers. It also granted
him the ability to check his personal emails and to store his personal
documents on the computer’s hard drive.
Unfortunately, twelve years later, Louis was terminated, and the
company repossessed his computer and denied him further access to its
electronic records and data. As the New York Court of Appeals noted (when
answering a certified question from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals),
Louis was “unable to retrieve his customer information and other personal
information that was stored on the [Nationwide] computers.”114
Louis sued Nationwide for, among other claims, the conversion of his
electronic documents.115 In determining whether the tort of conversion
applied to intangible electronic files such as those on Louis’s hard drive, the
New York Court of Appeals concluded that
electronic documents and records stored on a computer can . . . be
converted by simply pressing the delete button . . . . [I]t generally is not
the physical nature of a document that determines its worth, it is the
information memorialized in the document that has intrinsic value. A
manuscript of a novel has the same value whether it is saved in a
computer’s memory or printed on paper. So too, the information that
Thyroff allegedly stored on his leased computers in the form of electronic
records of customer contacts and related data has value to him regardless
of whether the format in which the information was stored was tangible
113 Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272 (N.Y. 2007); see also, e.g.,
Thompson v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 115 A.3d 125, 132 (Md. 2015) (noting that “digital media is
capable of being converted” while maintaining the validity of the merger doctrine). But cf. Wells
v. Chattanooga Bakery, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 381, 392 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (“[A]n action for the
conversion of intangible personal property is not recognized in Tennessee.”).
114 Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1273.
115 Id.
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or intangible. In the absence of a significant difference in the value of the
information, the protections of the law should apply equally to both
forms—physical and virtual.
In light of these considerations, we believe that the tort of
conversion must keep pace with the contemporary realities of widespread
computer use. We therefore . . . hold that the type of data that Nationwide
allegedly took possession of—electronic records that were stored on a
computer and were indistinguishable from printed documents—is subject
to a claim of conversion in New York. Because this is the only type of
intangible property at issue in this case, we do not consider whether any
of the myriad other forms of virtual information should be protected by
the tort.116

While the court acknowledged that determining the status of property
rights over the “myriad other forms of virtual information” would be
difficult, if not impossible, it did grant Louis the property ownership over the
data he lost. He was able to sue Nationwide for the conversion of his
electronic documents. Note that the nature of these documents is vastly
different from the types of information discussed above. Louis does not have
ownership over each electronic document because it “identifies, relates to,
or could reasonably be linked with” him.117 Rather, in this particular case,
the court employed a labor theory of property118 to recognize Louis’s rights
in the lost documents. The court found that “virtual creation” was sufficiently
like “production by pen on paper or quill on parchment” to yield similar
property rights.119
Unfortunately for Louis, and despite this ruling from the New York
Court of Appeals, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New
York granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment, and the Second
Circuit affirmed.120 Even though New York law would recognize his claim
116

Id. at 1278.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1)(A)–(K) (West 2022).
118 See generally Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 157
(2002) (summarizing Locke’s labor theory of property as “[t]he proposition that property arises
from laboring upon things in the world—mixing one's pre-owned labor with unowned things
. . . .”).
119 Thyroff, 864 N.E.2d at 1278 (“We cannot conceive of any reason in law or logic why this
process of virtual creation should be treated any differently from production by pen . . . . A
document stored on a computer hard drive has the same value as a paper document kept in a file
cabinet.”).
120 Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2006). The procedural history
of this case is complicated. Thyroff initially filed the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of New York, but after dismissal of the conversion claim upon a motion to dismiss, he
appealed to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit then held that whether electronic data can
support a claim for conversion is an unsettled question under New York law, but if it could, the
district court erred in holding that Thyroff failed to state a claim sufficient to survive Nationwide’s
motion to dismiss. The court then certified this question to the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at
407. The New York Court of Appeals answered the question in the affirmative, see Thyroff, 864
117
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against Nationwide, the court ruled that he did not “produce sufficient
evidence of demand to survive summary judgment.”121 But how could this
be? Louis told Nationwide that he had “lots of personal info on the
computer” and that he “want[ed] it back.” 122 According to the Second
Circuit, his demand was not sufficiently precise; “lots of personal info,”
according to the court, “could refer to anything from emails to customer
lists.”123
Louis’s lack of precision perfectly highlights a much larger problem for
data rights. Defining the bounds of a specific intangible digital asset can be
incredibly difficult.124 Defining the scope of digital property rights more
broadly is even harder. This is so for two primary reasons.
First, “[t]he amorphous nature of the digital world makes it difficult to
define a digital asset.”125 Determining what exactly is owned requires an
intimate knowledge of the technologies involved and an informed analysis
of the boundary between the digital asset and the operating system or other
software on which the asset exists. Imagine a Microsoft Word document. Is
the digital asset the bits as they are written on the hard drive? What about the
copy that is loaded onto RAM? What about the copy that is uploaded onto
Google Drive? Are they all the same asset? Are there now three distinct
assets in question? This is not a new or unique perspective. Benjamin
Hayward, for example, has noted that “digital products do not form a closed
list—the concept itself is hard to define.”126 Warren Agin, too, has noted that
electronic “things” such as data “are as hard to define as they sometimes are
to understand.”127 Because of these difficulties, some commentators have
adopted a functional approach. Rachael Ferrante and Kristina Sherry, for
example, have argued that “[f]or lack of a better description, a ‘default
working definition of digital assets will be anything owned that is in a digital
N.E.2d at 1272, and the Second Circuit then vacated the district court’s dismissal of Thyroff’s
conversion claim and remanded the case to the district court. See Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 493 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007). There, Nationwide moved for summary judgment. See Thyroff
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 360 F. App’x 179 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s grant of
summary judgment).
121 Id. at 181 (“The purpose of the demand requirement ‘is simply “that one in lawful possession
shall not have such possession changed into an unlawful one until he be informed of the defect of
his title and have an opportunity to deliver the property to the true owner.”’” (quoting Leveraged
Leasing Admin. Corp. v. PacifiCorp Cap., Inc., 87 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1996))).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See generally Marinotti, supra note 60 (noting that many intangible assets fail the theoretical
requisites for property rights, but not because of their intangibility; certain intangible crypto assets,
for example, may fulfill these same requirements).
125 Richard Martin & Shannon Noya Nairn, Estate Planning Guidance for the Protection of
Digital Assets, L.A. LAW., Oct. 2016, at 15.
126 Benjamin Hayward, What’s in a Name? Software, Digital Products, and the Sale of Goods,
38 SYDNEY L. REV. 441, 454 (2016).
127 Warren E. Agin, The Internet Bankruptcy: What Happens When the Bell Tolls for the
eCommerce Industry?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2002).
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file.’”128 This definition, however, would lead us to circular reasoning,
defining property in terms of what is owned and defining what is owned in
terms of property.
Second, defining digital property is difficult because of the nature of
these property rights themselves. Imagine the same Microsoft Word
document as above. Does the property right to exclude apply to each copy
(i.e., hard drive, RAM, Google Drive) independently? Does it apply to the
three as a collective? What happens when one copy is altered slightly? What
if only its metadata changes? Is this a trespass to chattel? Defining the rights
that align with data as property is just as hard as defining the boundaries of
the data itself. The nuances relevant to each asset, each type of data, may not
be applicable to all others. Relying on the common law’s foundational
instruments of stare decisis and reasoning by analogy to define the broad
category of data property rights will not yield sufficiently definite or useful
rights for the purposes of trust law.129
Ultimately, defining data and data rights—whether they are based on
personal information, theories of labor, or any other source—will be
difficult. Furthermore, such definitions may need to be context-specific
depending on the data or digital assets in question. Both of these points make
it difficult, if not impossible, for the law of trusts to recognize data trusts
without legislative intervention.130 Although determining the exact legal
nature of data is not a prerequisite for the creation of data trusts, these
difficulties nonetheless provide unanswered questions that will hinder the
adoption of data trusts as a means of private data governance.
III
BACK TO SQUARE ONE?

Despite the difficulties presented in this Essay, the goal of this
discussion was not to dissuade further research on the topic of data trusts.
Rather, the analysis presented here merely demonstrates that data trusts—as
they are currently envisioned—will not be able to bypass legislative
intervention through immediate private implementation. If that is the case,
however, one must seriously consider whether data trusts are indeed a better

128 Rachael E. Ferrante, The Relationship Between Digital Assets and Their Transference at
Death: “It’s Complicated”, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 37, 41–42 (2013) (citing Kristina Sherry, What
Happens to Our Facebook Accounts When We Die? Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of SocialMedia Assets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 194 (2012)) (noting that “definitions of what
constitutes digital assets vary significantly”).
129 At the same time, creating unique solutions for each possible type of digital asset is not only
an inefficient use of judicial resources; it may also risk infringing legislative authority.
130 Bypassing the need for legislative intervention is one of the alleged benefits of the data trust
approach. Austin & Lie, supra note 29, at 618 (“Instead of waiting for the slow process of law
reform to create such a regulatory framework, the trust model offers a way of managing these
emerging issues through a private law mechanism.”).
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governance strategy than any other legislatively implementable approach. As
Jonathan van Geuns and Ana Brandusescu note in their research for Mozilla
Insights, there are many emerging alternative forms of data governance and
data stewardship.131 Among others, data cooperatives, data commons, data
collaboratives, data fiduciaries, and data marketplaces all offer methods of
regulating the creation, dispersion, and exploitation of data. While each of
these methods has “imperfections,” all of them aim to “address imbalances
of power between data holders and data subjects.”132
Furthermore, data trusts should not only be compared to such wideranging, alternative frameworks; the costs and benefits of data trusts must
also be compared to the costs and benefits of the status quo: the evolving
distributed system of various data protection regulations such as the CCPA,
HIPAA, and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).133
CONCLUSION

Data trusts have been proposed as a data governance solution that
bypasses “the slow process” of legislative law reform.134 Unfortunately, the
analysis put forth in this Essay demonstrates that a legislative solution will
nonetheless be necessary to determine the existence and scope of data
property rights, even if merely under the requirements of equitable trust law.
Before rushing to promote the normative policy benefits of this governance
structure, it is crucially important to determine the viability and requisites of
its underlying legal infrastructure. Some have proposed software
implementation of trust-like governance solutions,135 or governmental or
public-private data-sharing frameworks,136 or even contracts, as discussed
above. But if data trusts are meant to benefit from the body and flexibility of
trust law, including its fiduciary relationships, data trusts must be actual
trusts. A renewed focus on the underlying infrastructure of trust as a legal
instrument is needed before discussions of data trusts can fully explore the
normative benefits of this governance strategy.

131

See MOZILLA INSIGHTS ET AL., supra note 33, at 4.
Id.
133 See supra note 110; see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.2 (2022) (codifying requirements for the
protection of privacy of parents and students).
134 Austin & Lie, supra note 29, at 618.
135 Governance of access, use, and profit of data can be technologically assigned through
cryptography and smart contracts. See, e.g., Sightline Innovation Security Products, SIGHTLINE
INNOVATION, https://www.sightlineinnovation.com/product [https://perma.cc/Q42X-BMWR]
(describing Sightline Innovation’s “audit trail of data usage and enforce[ment of] data usage rights
via smart contract”).
136 See, e.g., Silicon Valley Regional Data Trust (SVRDT), CTR. FOR COLLABORATIVE RSCH.
FOR AN EQUITABLE CAL., https://ccrec.ucsc.edu/partnerships/silicon-valley-regional-data-trust
[https://perma.cc/2E85-SHG2] (describing how the “Silicon Valley Regional Data Trust (SVRDT)
is a secure cross-sector data-sharing environment combining administrative records from
education, health and human services, and juvenile probation in the tri-county Silicon Valley”).
132
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Given the rapid expansion of the global datasphere with each passing
year, the fervor to address problems of data negligence and malfeasance—
as well as the inherent power imbalance between tech companies and the
individuals who use them—is both understandable and laudable. Each day
over “500 million tweets, 294 billion emails, 4 million gigabytes of
Facebook data, 65 billion WhatsApp messages and 720,000 hours of
[YouTube] content” are added to the world.137 By the year 2025, we are
expected to create, capture, copy, and consume “a mind-boggling 175 ZB
[zettabytes]” of data; to put that in context, one zettabyte is equivalent to
1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 (1021) bytes.138 This rapid expansion of the
datasphere will only further cement the need for data governance strategies
that successfully balance scientific innovation, economic prosperity,
personal privacy, and individual autonomy, among the many other interests
at stake currently being discussed in this rapidly evolving field of research.139
Given that data trusts are unlikely to offer refuge from the current legislative
gridlock, it is imperative that we develop and pursue doctrinally,
legislatively, and technologically implementable data governance solutions.

137 Melvin M. Vopson, The World’s Data Explained: How Much We’re Producing and Where
It’s All Stored, CONVERSATION (May 4, 2021, 11:17 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-worldsdata-explained-how-much-were-producing-and-where-its-all-stored-159964
[https://perma.cc/8Z6K-KUPY].
138 Or the equivalent of 8,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 individual bits of information. Id.
139 As the amount of data in the world swells to these astronomical numbers, its economic
value—and harmful potential—will only grow. While it is correct to assume that this imminent
flood will contain data that is simply industrial in nature (which may also be harnessed for misuse),
let us not forget the burgeoning market of Internet of Things devices such as cloud-synced baby
monitors, video doorbells, and smart home gadgets as well as the adoption of wearables such as the
Apple Watch, Snap Spectacles, the Google Assistant-connected Pixel Buds, and the many fitness
trackers entering the market. These represent a growing source of personal data “encouraging mass
exploitation of consumer data and posing security threats on an unprecedented scale.” Sarah Shyy,
The GDPR’s Lose-Lose Dilemma: Minimal Benefits to Data Privacy & Significant Burdens on
Business, 20 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 137, 139–40 (2020) (discussing specifically how the terms of
service agreements provided by Google and Facebook, which users must consent to in order to
access their services, have defanged the GDPR).

